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Islamism is one of the currents in the political thought of the Islamic world. It considers 
religion an ideology and uses it in political struggle. Its goal is to develop a model of 
socio-political development based on Islamic norms. Islamism is a socio-political thought 
deeply engraved in the minds of the inhabitants of the Near and Middle East and a very 
popular ideology due to the social order it envisages. For decades, in the Arab Middle 
East, Islamism as a political movement was pushed down into the political underground, 
but the events of 2011, referred to as the Arab Spring, have given to Islamist groups, 
new opportunities to take political action. It is commonly believed that if the Middle 
East keeps embracing democracy, Islamist organisations will gain access to the systems 
of the government and, in some cases, could even dominate them. A harbinger of that 
were the parliamentary elections in Tunisia in September 2011, where the Islamist party 
Ennahda received the largest number of votes. What model of international relations 
does Islamism present and what is its vision of the world order?
Ideological Principles
Modern Islamism is derived from the Egyptian Society of Muslim Brothers, also known 
simply as the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in 1928 and has survived in 
deep secrecy as a persecuted underground movement, giving rise to many other similar 
organisations in other Arab countries of the Middle East. The ideology of the Muslim 
Brotherhood gave rise to the Muslim terrorist organisations. Forming its conceptions of 
development, Islamism refers to Islam, to its norms and perception of the functioning of 
the society. It is very difficult to polemicise against Islamism, since it is, in fact, a dispute 
over the understanding of the symbols of Muslim culture and religion, and debates on 
the tactics of political action between Islamists themselves and between Islamists and 
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non-Islamists often turn into a fight with verses from the Quran and with hadiths and 
even fatwas, that is legal opinions on the compliance of actual or intended conduct 
with Muslim law.1
The vision of international order in Islamism results from the specific perception 
of the world. In Islamist ideology, the world is theocentric and the Quran, the Holy 
Book of Islam, is the main source of knowledge about it. The book deals with values 
and principles which concern all aspects of human life, including social issues and, 
consequently, the sphere of politics as well. The art of deciphering the meanings and 
interpreting allegories in the Quran has been long known in Islam as ta’wil.2 On the 
one hand, due to the richness of metaphors in the Arabic languages and the mosaic of 
literary styles in the Quran, ta’wil is an art of explaining lexical meanings and, on the 
other hand, a search for contextual meanings which usually are not directly related to 
the lexical sense and sometimes can even be its opposite.3 In the Islamist ideology, the art 
of ta’wil mainly comes down to modernising the very context of the Quran’s teachings 
by suggesting the existence of new meanings and references to new circumstances in 
the lexical content well known to the listeners.4
The unquestioned master of the interpretation of the Quran was Sayyid Qutb, an 
Egyptian Islamist ideologist executed in 1966, during an intensive political conflict 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Qutb 
is one of the Islamist ideologists who had the most influence on the history of the 
Muslim world in the twentieth century. His commentary to the Quran published in 
the multivolume work Fi Zilal al-Qur’an (In the Shade of the Qur’an) is still extremely 
popular in the Muslim world.5
In the Islamist view, the world is mono-centric, but temporarily bipolar. The 
‘monocentrism’ is expressed by the fact that Islam is the only religion leading to God 
and the perfect socio-political system given to mankind by God so that it is introduced 
on earth. The world is temporarily bipolar, because there persist other religions and 
social systems. However, as these are false, destructive and faulty, they will be gradually 
displaced by Islam until they vanish completely. Thus, the dynamics of international 
relations come down to moving the line between the Islamic world and the non-Islamic 
world or, in other words, to the ‘Islamisation’ of the non-Muslim world. This vision of 
the world refers to the classical views of Muslim jurists of the first centuries of Islam 
who divided the world into two parts: the so-called house of Islam (Dar al-Islam), an 
area of peace, and the house of war (Dar al-Harb), that is, the non-Muslim world.
In Islamist ideology, the history of the world is linear and has a beginning, which 
is the creation of the world by God, and an end, namely the Day of Judgement. This 
is a vision of Islam itself, as is the place of the most important event in mankind’s 
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history – Muhammad’s prophetic vision and the birth of a new faith, which was the 
ultimate Revelation. Islamists also pass a radical judgement – characteristic of Muslim 
fundamentalism and traditionalism – on the history of the world. To what happened 
before Islam they refer as jahiliyyah – a state of ignorance, darkness and struggle lacking 
the proper understanding of God. Islam changed that and became the right path to 
God, a gift which was accepted by those who were aware of this fact with appreciation 
and gratitude towards God.
Islamism also presents another idea characteristic of Muslim fundamentalism, 
namely, the concept of the great deformation, the departure of the Muslim community 
from Muhammad’s teachings on the functioning of the state. This deformation is 
believed to have happened very early, namely, after the rule of the first four caliphs – 
Muhammad’s successors as religious and state leaders. The said caliphs ruled in the years 
632–661 and are known in the history of Islam as the Righteous or Rightly Guided 
Caliphs. In that period, the Muslim state was strong and prosperous, with wise leaders 
and happy subjects. However, this ‘golden age’ did not last long.6 Subsequent rulers 
stopped obeying God’s law. They appropriated power and treated it as their own and 
their families’ property. They forgot that they were but exponents of God’s will on earth. 
They believed themselves to be the ultimate lawmakers and not only started modifying 
God’s law, but also replaced it with law which was alien, unrevealed, and consequently, 
by definition imperfect and favouring the interests of certain groups instead of the entire 
community. With time, the rulers became alienated from the societies and in the next 
centuries the world of Islam was even ruled by foreigners, who only later converted to 
Islam but never truly understood the essence of its message.7
In Islamist interpretation, the history of the world after the emergence of Islam is 
an endless series of attacks against Islam by its enemies, who have fought it because 
it is God’s revelation and who, consequently, are in fact not strictly the enemies of 
Islam, but of God himself. Thus, fighting with Islam is fighting with God, which only 
the forces of evil and darkness, the forces of Satan can do. These were the crusaders, 
who pretended to defend the true faith, even though it is common knowledge that 
Christianity is not a true faith, since the disciples of Jesus corrupted the Revelation, 
the moment they mistook their master to be the Son of God. After the crusaders came 
a new enemy, much more powerful than the previous one, namely colonialism. Faced 
with the Muslims’ steadfast defence of their faith, colonialism had to yield, but then 
it created a new tool to put pressure on the Islamic world – Zionism. It took root in 
the very heart of the Muslim homeland and its actions are directed not only against 
the material interests of the Islamic nation, but also against the very Muslim faith. In 
the Islamist ideology we find the characteristic thought that the attacks against Islam 
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are increasing alongside the increasing need to tell the world about the true Revelation 
provided to mankind by God through Muhammad. The struggle between the forces of 
God and the forces of Satan turns into a global conflict and becomes more and more 
intensive, which is a sign for all true Muslims that they must meet the challenge and 
prepare for the final battle.8
The West as the Enemy
Criticism of the West as the chief enemy is an important and permanent element of 
Islamist ideology. It concerns both the policy of the Western states towards the Islamic 
world and Western socio-political thought. Within several decades of the existence of 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organisations, this criticism has undergone an 
evolution. Some Islamist ideologists softened the blade of criticism by stablishing the 
moderate current and focusing on criticising not the West itself, but its policy towards 
the Muslim world. Others, in turn, sharpened it, criticising the West as the enemy of 
the forces of God and of the Revelation itself.
In this respect, radical Islamism refers to Sayyid Qutb, who formulated the conclusion 
of degeneration of the Western civilisation and its imminent collapse. Qutb, who knew 
the West from personal experience as he spent some time working and studying in the 
USA, ultimately rejected the Western secular liberalism, as well as the two governance 
systems present in Europe, namely, capitalism and communism. The Egyptian ideologist 
associated the West with the Biblical Pharaoh from the story about Moses.9 Several suras 
of the Quran speak of Moses: Sura 2: ‘Baqara’(verses 47–73), Sura 7: ‘A’rāf’ (103–162), 
Sura 10: ‘Yūnus’ (74–92), Sura 20: ‘Tā-Ha’ (9–98), Sura 26: ‘Shu’arāa’ (10–69), Sura 
27: ‘Naml’ (7–14), and Sura 28: ‘Qasas’ (1–42). The Quran also emphasises the figure 
of the Pharaoh, whom Moses convinces to accept his prophetic mission and to whom 
he speaks in the following words: ‘O Pharaoh! I am an apostle from the Lord of the 
Worlds’ (7: 104). The Israeli people are oppressed by the Pharaoh [‘We have had (nothing 
but) trouble, before and after thou camest to us’–7: 129], but for this God punishes the 
Pharaoh and his people [‘We punished the people of Pharaoh with years (of drought) 
and shortness of crops’–7: 130].10
Qutb believed that the confrontation between Moses and the Pharaoh resembled 
the current situation in the world. The difference was that the present-day tyrants were 
more ruthless. The Pharaoh had a conversation with Moses and wanted to make sure 
whether Moses really was such a great prophet, as he so claimed. The tyrants of the 
twentieth century do not have even the slightest doubts about the rightness of their 
beliefs and direct all their power against those who follow the path laid out by God. 
Torture, persecution, enslavement, and falsehood – this is what one can expect from 
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the rulers who do not recognise the power of God. The only thing that can prevent 
this is resolute opposition to the usurpers. However, mobilisation of the people of the 
true faith against the usurper power should be diametrically different than in the times 
to which the story of Moses refers. The opposition to tyrants must be universal and 
radical, says Qutb, as God is on our side and will punish the present day tyrants the 
same way He punished the Pharaoh and his people.11
Categorical anti-Occidentalism is a very important premise of the Islamist vision 
of international relations. Hasan al-Banna, the creator of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
was deeply troubled by the influence of the West on the traditional lifestyle in the 
Muslim countries. The new ideas, nihilist from his point of view, which seeped to the 
Arab Middle East from Europe and which were taking root in the Egyptian society, 
were leading him to the conclusion that the Islamic world was in a state of collapse 
and was losing its cultural identity. For al-Banna, the transformations taking place in 
Turkey under Mustafa Kemal, and particularly the abolition of the institution of the 
caliphate, were proof that the Western world intended to destroy the Muslim Middle 
East by depriving it of its traditional state system and institutions.12
He believed the state of the Muslim society to be critical. The reason for this was 
the fact that it was developing in the wrong manner and was heading in the wrong 
direction. According to al-Banna, in the 1930s Egypt was at a crossroads and faced with 
two paths – the path of the West and the path of Islam. The Western civilisation was 
in a state of collapse and compromised itself.13 He saw some positive elements in the 
Western civilisation (understood as the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union), such 
as respecting the rights of the individual, the right of workers to defend their interests, 
the care for the poor, and the abolishing of class divisions in the socialist system, but 
generally he rejected it as not suiting the socio-political concept of Islam due to the 
Western civilisation’s gradual secularisation and domination of material values over the 
spiritual ones. This was leading to a depravation of the society and its collapse. The 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood pointed to the example of those Arab countries 
which had yielded to the Western influence and when he highlighted their poor social 
and economic condition he believed the reasons for this situation to be related to this 
Western influence. Al-Banna stressed many times that the sources for a revival of the 
Egyptian society would be found not in the West, but in the East.14
A very determined anti-Occidentalism is visible in the works of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb 
closely followed the events taking place in Palestine since the 1930s and preceding the 
division of the country and the establishment of Israel. He was convinced that the 
West, and particularly the United States, was not neutral towards Palestine and that it 
sided with Israel. This conviction had a strong influence on his views on the Western 
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model of development. He wrote that the West has created a society of inequalities and 
social pathologies. He did not perceive any significant differences between socialism and 
capitalism in the ‘Western path’. He did not treat socialism and capitalism as different 
methods of production, but evaluated them from the point of view of ideology and 
the role of religion in the given system. From this point of view, the ideologies of the 
bourgeois state and socialist ideology were equally materialist and, consequently, heathen. 
According to Qutb, communist ideology with its materialist interpretation of history, 
atheism and class struggle was a natural phase in the development of the materialist 
Western civilisation; what made it different from the other European ideologies was 
not the manner but the scale of perceiving the problems and the type of organisational 
solutions.15
For Qutb, the West was a Christian-Jewish environment. Therefore, when writing 
about the West, he often referred to these verses of the Quran which spoke of Christians 
and Jews. He focused especially on the verses 109 and 120 from Sura 2, which are 
supposed to confirm his conviction of the eternal intention of Christians and Jews 
to destroy Islam. These verses were interpreted in the same way by Muslims in the 
time of the crusades and were to warn Muslims against following the path proposed 
by Christianity and Judaism.16 Qutb strengthened his arguments supporting this 
interpretation by referring to the policy of colonialism towards the Islamic countries 
and to the activities of Zionism in Palestine. Orientalists, who promoted a distorted 
image of Islam and Muslims, were also enemies of Islam. Referring to this, he wrote 
that it was unthinkable that Muslims would learn about their own religion and cultural 
heritage from books written by Jewish orientalists.17
In Qutb’s opinion, the independence of Islam’s political thought from capitalist 
and socialist systems came down to the fact that, as a consequence of the different 
conditions in which Christianity and Islam were born, politics and religion in Islam 
are inseparable.18 Christianity emerged when Roman laws were in force and the rules 
of conduct in secular matters had been set for a long time. Thus, Christ’s teachings 
focused on the relations between man and God, leaving the relations between people 
and the state to the existing law. As for Islam, the situation was diametrically different. 
It propagated the inseparability of religion and the state and regulated all relations, 
both the spiritual and the secular. Consequently, separating religion from politics in 
Islam is equal to depriving it of its very essence.19 Qutb believes that the materialist 
ideologies of the West were experiencing a deep crisis and were in a state of collapse. 
The struggle between them was nearing an end. At the same time, a new struggle was 
starting, a struggle of two main ideas of the modern world: the humanist idea, that is 
Islam, and the materialist idea, represented by communism as the highest stage of its 
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development.20 Qutb was convinced that the Muslim system would take the place of 
the dying materialist systems. He wrote of it explicitly as a worldwide system, to which 
the entire humanity was heading, and not a regional system within what was referred 
to as the Arab world, for it was, he believed, a system which met the needs of mankind 
to a greater degree than any other system.21
The Moderate Current and the Concept of New Order
In the 1990s, there was a considerable shift in the views of Islamist ideologists on the 
relations with the West, that is, on the vision of the world order. The groups of ‘centrist’ 
or ‘new’ Islamists, which started forming in many Arab countries, rejected the position 
that the processes originating in the West should simply be ignored. Furthermore, they 
openly said that the world of Islam could not turn away from what was happening 
in the world and had to face the development-related challenges of modernity. They 
proposed devising a native ‘national development programme’, which would allow, 
on the one hand, to participate in the processes of globalisation and, on the other, to 
prevent surrendering to the dictate of world superpowers and international financial 
institutions. Fahmi Huwaidi, an Egyptian author and the leading expert of the so-called 
new Islamism, writes that the Muslim reflection on the nature of the West is essential 
for the future of Islam, as understanding the West will allow Muslims to comprehend 
the nature of Islam itself and to learn at which stage of development the Muslim world 
now is.22
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a well-known interpreter of the Quran and the leading ideologist 
of Islamism, believes that globalisation is a new era and a great challenge to the Islamic 
identity and the Muslim religious attitudes. He writes that in the past epochs, Muslims 
ignored the West; they talked with each other and were not even aware that someone 
might hear them. But now Muslims should not confine themselves to their own group. 
According to the author, such attitudes would be dangerous and detrimental, as in the 
present times we cannot fail to notice that we are not alone in the world, but there are 
others there as well. There are other religions and civilisations apart from Islam. Today, 
no society can afford to be in isolation or shut itself away.23
Al-Qaradawi suggests a departure from traditional terminology in the perception 
of the followers of different religions. He also proposes not to call non-Muslims the 
‘unfaithful’ (kuffar) anymore and to refer to them simply as ‘non-Muslims’ (ghajru 
muslimin); and consequently, to stop calling Christians and Jews living in Muslim 
countries ‘the people under protection’ (ahl al-dhimma) and simply refer to them as 
‘citizens’ (muwatinun). This proposal meant that the century-old tradition, firmly rooted 
in the Muslim consciousness, would be discarded. Al-Qaradawi quotes arguments with 
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much weight to support his view. First, he names the verses 83–86 from Sura 6: ‘An’ām’, 
in which God speaks to the Muslims that the folk of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, 
John and Jesus were guided by God and followed God’s path. Then he refers to the 
same Sura to show the ambiguity of the term kafir (idolater). Its principal meaning is 
a man who does not believe in God and life eternal. While Christians and Jews, even 
though they do not believe in Muhammad’s mission, believe in God and in the Day 
of Judgement. Islam refers to them as ahl al-kitab, that is the ‘people of the book’, 
as they have experienced God’s Revelation. Now, can one really call them idolaters 
(kuffar), asks al-Qaradawi. Another name the Muslims give to Christians and Jews is 
ahl al-dhimma, or the ‘people of the dhimma’. This term originated in the early history 
of Islam and refers to those who were under the protection of Islam as non-Muslims. 
Al-Qaradawi stresses that this term is not offensive to Christians and Jews, but if the 
Egyptian Copts do not wish to be referred to in this way, their will should be honoured 
and they should be simply called ‘citizens’ (muwatinun).24
Openness towards the West, neither uncritical nor unconditional, is a characteristic 
feature of the moderate Islamist thought. Muhammad al-Ghazali, the Egyptian religious 
thinkers (died in 1996), believed that the human civilisation made a huge progress in 
the development of knowledge, technical discoveries and production solutions, and that 
it would be a mistake to believe that mankind owes the current level of development 
solely to the Islamic civilisation; it is the work of the entire mankind, the achievement of 
the human mind in general. He further stated that the world civilisation was a common 
good of Muslims, Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and atheists – that is those who 
do not believe in God – as all they sit down at the common negotiations table at the 
UN to debate on the matters of the world. This was praiseworthy, he believed.25 At the 
same time, al-Ghazali referred to the example of al-Afghani and Abduh, great reformers 
of Islam who did not reject the Western civilisation and apart from its mistakes, they 
also saw the features which were positive for Islam.26
An interesting view on the state of the development of the world and the relations 
with the West has been formulated by Amru Khaled. This well-known Muslim preacher, 
whose webpages are followed and read by hundreds of millions of Muslims speaks 
about the contemporary world, its problems and what kind of a person one should 
be. The starting point of his vision is the conviction that the world of Islam is in a 
state of collapse and that this state should be changed. Amru Khaled is familiar with 
the development indicators calculated by the United Nations Development Programme, 
which show that the Arab world is lagging behind in terms of development, that it has 
high illiteracy and unemployment rates, that Arabs live shorter than Americans, that 
they have worse conditions for education and less free time. While speaking about this, 
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the preacher also points out that while this state is a legacy of colonialism, it is also a 
result of the low involvement of Muslims in reforming their countries. This is where 
his views differ from those of many ideologists in the world of Islam, who believe 
all contemporary evil to result from colonialism and the machinations of the global 
imperialism. For example, Khaled points out that in the USA, there are 4,000 engineers 
per 1 million of inhabitants, while in the Arab countries there are only 300. The 
situation is similar with the number of physicians, newspapers and computers. Khaled 
believes that any improvement in this field depends largely on the Muslims themselves 
and their governments. He speaks sharp and emphatic words about the Muslim world, 
claiming that Muslims only take but give nothing in return, that they are the parasites 
of the world. While doing this he also cites the hadith in which Muhammad said that 
those who make an effort to contribute to the common good are better than those who 
remain idle and only think about their own comfort.27
International Order and the Governance System
In Islamist ideology, international relations are the sphere in which the Muslim state 
performs its tasks. Therefore, in order to understand the vision of these relations, it is 
important to know what the Islamist ideologists consider the desirable system of ruling 
and governing in an era of globalisation. This refers to both the political philosophy 
and the individual solutions of state organisation. Al-Ghazali and the other ‘centrists’ 
have been the proponents of the solution they call the ‘Islamic solution’ (al-hal al-
Islami). It is supposed to combine the unique Muslim approach to development with 
the approaches representing the experience of other cultures. It is also very important 
that the Islamic solution creates only the general framework for social development on 
the basis of Islam. Individual solutions can and surely will be different, depending on 
specific historical and political factors in the individual countries of the Muslim world. 
What is suitable for Algeria, Syria or Jordan does not necessarily have to be suitable 
for Egypt, wrote Fahmi Huwaidi.28
At the same time, there exist boundaries of freedom in creating the system and its 
institutions. They are set by the place of Muslim law in the state. Islam is a revealed 
religion and the content of the Revelation has been included in the legal norms which, 
as a result, are a religious and revealed law. The Muslim law, Sharia, is the proper 
guideline for all the faithful and its observance is the path to salvation. But should it 
be implemented by the state by the already established norms, or should it rather be 
a guideline for the lawmakers in their reflections on what is acceptable and what is 
forbidden? There is no consensus among Islamist ideologists in this respect. Some of 
them believe that implementing the existing norms of Muslim law is what the state is 
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unconditionally obliged to do. These are, for instance, Muhammad Salim al-Awa and 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the former stating that governance in Islam is practicing religious 
law29 and the latter claiming that the state was created for the purpose of supervising the 
observance of Muslim law. Al-Qaradawi uses the term dawla islamiyya – ‘Islamic state’ 
interchangeably with the term hukm al-islam – ‘the rule of Islam’. He also writes that 
an Islamic state is only a state in which the entirety of the social life is governed by the 
Sharia. Muslims living outside the Islamic state live in sin,30 he concludes. This Islamist 
ideologist known for his conservative views has formulated the view that everyone who 
does not believe that governance should be based on religious law commits the sin of 
unbelief (kufr), of which the Quran speaks in Sura 16.31
The essential question in relation to systemic solutions is the one about political 
pluralism, namely whether the political system in an Islamic state is to be a system with 
one religious party or a system with many parties and such organisations as labour 
unions.32 Al-Ghazali answered this question in an indirect manner, although without 
leaving any doubt about the essence of the matter. On one hand, in the chapter ad-Din 
wa-d-daula (Religion and State) of the book Mustaqbal al-Islam kharij ardih (The Future 
of Islam Outside its Land) he writes that in Islam faith is inseparably connected to the 
state. There was such a connection in the state of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. However, 
this does not imply that it should be so nowadays as well. The Muslim civilisation is 
a dynamic culture, changing over time, through the centuries. Therefore, the issue of 
relations between religion and state should be approached from the historical perspective; 
we should study history and not copy it blindly. Thus, what is needed is tafsir, that is, 
interpretation of the factors shaping the social reality.33
The notion of worldview pluralism is one of the main topics in speeches and 
publications of centrist Islamists. They consider pluralism as something indispensible 
in the Muslim state and the necessary condition for its successful development. The 
starting point for the reflections in this regard is the diversity of the views in Islam itself, 
which has been a part of the Islam since its very beginnings. This refers to the four 
madhabs, schools of Muslim law, and the actual religious diversity of the societies of 
Muslim states. Fahmi Huwaidi, who writes broadly about democracy in Muslim state, 
is a fervent supporter of tolerance for other religions and worldviews. At the same time, 
he does not agree with Abul A’la Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, ideologists of Muslim 
radicalism, who speak about non-Muslims with clear aversion.34
In the opinion of moderate Islamists, it is unquestionable that non-Muslims need 
to have a permanent and safe place in the Muslim society. This indicates a considerable 
change in Islamist ideology. In the 1940s and 1950s, the social sentiments of religious 
chauvinism stirred up by the ideas of al-Banna led to increased hostility towards Egyptian 
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Christians and Jews. The new Islamists categorically reject the view represented by the 
extremists that there are two histories of Egypt: the Coptic (Christian) and the Muslim 
one. This approach leads to a division of the society into two mutually hostile factions, 
whereas the two religious groups each have their share in Egypt’s history and share the 
same moral and ethical values. The protection of the rights of minorities is treated as 
an element of the broader issue of political and civil rights. Referring to the practice 
in the first Muslim state in the times of Muhammad, Yusuf al-Qaradawi writes that 
in this state, Muslims had also the guaranteed rights to ownership and work. The 
theologian argues that since the first Muslim state functioned under God’s law, no one 
may question or change this state of affairs.35
As we can see, the views of contemporary Islamism on the state’s political system 
and governance clearly draw on the concept of European liberal constitutionalism. At 
the same time, we can also see the reference to traditional Muslim concepts, especially 
the political philosophy of Islam. This induces a reflection on what the elaborate 
disquisitions of Islamists ideologists on political pluralism really mean and whether 
moderate Islamism is indeed evolving in the direction of European liberal thought – as 
it is suggested by some European experts.36
Egyptian moderate Islamists are surely fully aware of the growing role of 
external determinants in the development of the Arab world. The development of the 
contemporary world as a whole in consequence of the thickening network of technical, 
business and interpersonal relations is a topic frequently touched upon in discussions 
and publications, as are the poverty and underdevelopment of the Arab world in terms 
of material production.37 New Islamism is more oriented towards the West than the 
generation of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb and believes that a reflection on what 
the West is to Islam and on which level of development the Muslim countries are now, is 
very important. This reflection is by no means easy to Muslims, because – as al-Qaradawi 
writes – the West did a great deal of injustice to Muslims in the past, especially in the 
period of colonialism. Muslims are, therefore, cautious and distrustful of what the West 
offers. However, it is inevitable that the world of Islam will turn to the West, for we are 
living in a time of intensive contacts and revolutions in the field of communication.38 
Al-Qaradawi calls upon the West to abandon hostility towards Islam and the policy 
which is a continuation of the Mediaeval crusades. A change of attitude towards 
the Islam would help Muslim open their minds to the West and establish a dialogue 
on different planes. Are we speaking about a cultural and intellectual confrontation 
between the Islam and the West or about a political and military confrontation?, asks 
al-Qaradawi. If it is an intellectual confrontation, he continues, Muslims have nothing 
against that, as then each party can present its views and the confrontation is bound to 
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turn into a dialogue and an exchange of views and values. However, he also stresses that 
Muslims do not want foreign values to be imposed on them; the West must abandon 
its position of arrogance and superiority and the way in which it imposes its culture 
on the Islam using military power.39
Amru Khaled talks about the attitude of the world of Islam towards the Western 
world in the age of globalisation to hundreds of millions of his readers. On his main 
webpage, Amru Khaled promotes the programme titled ‘Sunaa’ al-Hayah’, that is ‘Life 
Makers’, which calls for people to make a new life together, hand in hand, as their fate 
depends on themselves and their actions depend on their will.40
The so called new Arab Islamists also have a critical attitude towards terrorism as 
a means of political struggle, as well as towards the export of the Islamic revolution. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, the problem of terrorism in Egyptian politics became as serious 
as to provoke discussions in many political and intellectual circles. It was estimated that 
there were approximately fifty terrorist groups active in the country. In April 1988, Saad 
Edwin Ibrahim, a well-known activist for human rights and political freedoms, published 
an article in the magazine Third World Quarterly in which he wrote that the ‘Islamic 
revival’ was starting to dominate the Egyptian political discourse and that the idea of 
imposing an ‘Islamic system’ was successfully competing with democratic, socialist, 
liberal, and even nationalist thought.41 The opponents of the extremists undertook 
attempts to halt the tendency for public acceptance for the inevitability of the ‘Islamic 
revolution’, for instance through undermining the terrorists’ religious argumentation on 
apostasy. The best-known attempts were the polemics with the radicals of Muhammad 
Said al-Ashmawi, a famous lawyer and justice of the Egyptian Supreme Court. 
Al-Ashmawi is the author of many books on Muslim law, the foundations of faith, the 
system of power in Islam, the religious norms concerning economic activity, and others. 
In 1987 he published the book al-islam al-siyasi (Political Islam), in which he made a 
frontal assault on Islamism, and in particular militant Islamism. First of all, al-Ashmawi 
contested the common opinion that in Islam power and faith had always been strictly 
connected. Then he dealt with the concept of hakimiyya – ‘the sovereignty of God’, 
to which the extremists often refer. He believed that in Quran the term hukm meant 
‘judgement’, ‘solving disputes’, and not ‘exercising power’ or ‘governing’ as the extremists 
would claim. Then al-Ashmawi analysed the verses 44–47 from Sura 5: ‘Mā’ida’, 65 
and 105–107 from Sura 4: ‘Nisāa’, which, according to extremists, expressed the 
obligation to kill infidels and treat as apostates all those who do not live in accordance 
with the norms of Islam and, consequently, do not submit to ‘the sovereignty of God’. 
The author argued that the verses had referred to particular situations in the times of 
Muhammad and that they could not be applied to the later period, when religious and 
secular power had been separated.42
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The moderate current of the Muslim Brotherhood generally dissociated itself from 
terror, but not all the activists did so unconditionally. For instance, Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
emphasised that death of a Muslim by the hand of a Muslim was at variance with the 
principles of faith and was an action characteristic of people in the times of jahiliyyah, 
that is in the pre-Muslim era. In this regard, al-Qaradawi quoted several verses from 
the Quran, including verse 151 from Sura 6: ‘An’ām’: ‘Take not life, which God Hath 
made sacred, except By way of justice and law’. Nevertheless, al-Qaradawi admits there 
are situations in which killing is admissible. In the relations between Muslims, such a 
situation is when a Muslim becomes an apostate. However, the judgement of who is 
to be considered an apostate cannot be made by a person who is not competent in this 
regard.43 Al-Qaradawi also admits the possibility of using murder in the relations between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in a situation when the former have to defend against the 
attacks of the latter. Al-Qaradawi, a preacher well-known in the entire Islamic world, 
has on several occasions dissociated himself from acts of terror. For example, he has 
condemned the bombing in London of 7 July 2005, calling it a disgrace. However, 
previous to that, he often spoke about the fighters in Iraq using terror against the US 
forces as martyrs,44 and in his book al-Islam wa al-almaniyya wajhan li-wajh (Islam 
and Secularism Face to Face) he has presented terrorist actions as a form of defence 
forced by an aggression of the secularised Western civilisation on the Islamic world.45
Muhammad al-Ghazali was much more explicit in condemning terrorism. In his 
works he stated that the actions of extremists (mutatarrifun) who used violence and 
killed for political goals in the name of God were proof that they had sick minds. At 
the same time, this phenomenon indicates that it is not only individuals but the entire 
social system that is sick. Unemployment, extremely bad living conditions, no prospects 
for a better future, and the lack of confidence in the authorities are the prime sources 
of terrorism. Terrorism is product of the sick imagination of people shoved to the 
margin, left in a hopeless situation, uneducated, blindly following their leaders, who 
wrongly interpret the holy texts and are but pseudo-imams. Repressions brought down 
on terrorists and their sympathisers by the authorities cannot alone solve the problem 
and such actions should be condemned, as they only give rise to new injustice and 
create new divisions in the society. The only solution is a radical reform of education 
and upbringing. Ta’alim (teaching) and tarbiyya (raising and development) should be 
radically changed and based on religious values. A reform like that would additionally 
give people confidence in the purposefulness of what they are doing.46
The Egyptian Islamists connected with the al-Wasat Party dissociated themselves 
from terrorism even more explicitly. In October 1994, in the seat of the Medical 
Association, Issam al-Iryan and Abu al-Ala Madi organised a two-day conference on 
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the fundamental civic rights and freedoms. Hundreds of well-known activists from non-
governmental organisations and intellectuals took part in this conference. A delegation 
of the participants, including the main organisers, went to a hospital to visit Naguib 
Mahfouz, the Nobel Prize winner in literature who was earlier attacked and wounded 
with a knife by a militant Islamist. During the conference, the participants condemned 
the act of terror and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement 
in which it announced that attacks by militant Islamists on tourist and state officials 
were unacceptable. Furthermore, the leaders of the Association called on the radicals 
to arrange a cease fire with the government.47
Islamism and Arab Spring
The eruption of social protest in the Arab countries in 2011 became a huge opportunity 
for Islamists to fill the political void after the dissolution of government parties and 
opened the prospect of free parliamentary elections. The prospect of the Islamists gaining 
access to power has upset many politicians and businessmen. They were convinced that 
the Arab states would neither be democratic nor tolerant and that ‘Islamisation’ would 
result in non-Muslims becoming second-class citizens. Businessmen started expressing 
concerns that freedom of economic activity would not be preserved under Islamist 
rule and that state institutions would interfere in entrepreneurship too deeply. Large 
business predicted that the expected expansion of social programmes would upset the 
budget and lead to increasing the taxes paid by the wealthiest citizens and that the 
raise in wages would result in increased costs of labour, which, in turn, would scare 
off foreign investors and slow down economic development. Some Egyptian politicians 
were concerned that under the Islamist rule, the Arab countries would follow the Iranian 
path of development.48
However, there are still many sceptics who do not believe that the Brotherhood 
will achieve victory in the elections and will be able to act in the democratic political 
arena. Some Egyptian analysts believe that authoritarianism is the ideal environment 
for the Brotherhood, as it favours populism and puts ideology and religion in the 
foreground of political struggle. In the circumstances of political pluralism, when the 
political battles are fought with programmes – that is concrete proposals of specific social 
and economic solutions – the Brotherhood has trouble fitting in. According to these 
analysts, the Salafists, that is, Islamists with extremely conservative views, are likely to 
be a much more serious opponents to liberals, secularists and Copts.49 The secularists 
call them ‘Egyptian Taliban’ because they strictly adhere to the letter of the Quran, 
observe moral conservatism and exhibit a relentless hostility towards the Christian West. 
Salafists were either activists in terrorist groups themselves or inspired terrorists with 
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their uncompromising attitude towards the authorities, which they considered ‘godless’. 
When Mubarak stepped down, many of them were let out of prisons among the people 
repressed by the former regime and now rehabilitated. Others returned to Egypt from 
forced emigration. In April 2011, Salafists blocked a railway protesting against the 
nomination of a Christian by the new authorities to the post of governor of the Qena 
province in Upper Egypt. In Cairo, Salafists provoked clashes with Christians in the 
Imbaba district which resulted in twelve deaths. The military authorities did not dare 
attack the Salafists and made attempts to reach an understanding with them through 
one of their sheikhs, Muhammad Hassan. This, however, only consolidated the Islamist 
conservatives.
Summary
In the reflections of Islamist ideologists on international relations, there are some 
characteristic currents and tendencies. First of all, we can discern the conviction of having 
exclusive rights to interpret the history of Islam due to the only right understanding of 
the holy texts on rule and governance. This refers especially to the first generation of 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who believed the political doctrine of Islam to be 
constant, unwavering and explicit regarding the divine nature of rule in the Islam. The 
new generation is more diverse in their opinions on political power and the international 
order. Some Islamist ideologists believe that the doctrine does not specify any single 
standard of behaviour in the sphere of politics on the basis of which one could develop 
the model of a universal political system for all social situations. While some point to 
the caliphate as the model system to implement, others believe that it was not at all in 
accordance with the principles of the doctrine. This controversy makes it much easier 
to understand the words of the Egyptian author Muhammad Amara who said that the 
essence of political power had always been the most disputable and dangerous subject 
in Muslim political thought.50
The controversy regarding the political system in Islamism is a significant fact, 
because foreign policy, as Islamist ideologists understand it, is an instrument used for 
pursuing the interests of the state. The character of the state – whether it is authoritarian 
or democratic – will, therefore, affect the directions of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, 
some currents in contemporary Islamist ideology are lasting and unchanging. The most 
important one is the criticism of the West – some criticise it as a civilisation, while others 
for its policy towards the Muslim world. Even moderate Islamists are extremely critical 
of the Western – especially the USA’s – policy in the Middle East. In internal affairs, 
this constitutes their power, as they are credible in the eyes of other Muslims, but in the 
international arena this position severely limits their room for manoeuvre. Even though 
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it is not about xenophobia, but criticism of the USA policy in the Middle East, the West 
does not trust them. Overcoming the mistrust in the relations with the West is the key 
to the political future of moderate Islamism and the process of democratisation of the 
Middle East. The situation is very difficult and delicate, also for the West, for which an 
Islamist only or partially Islamist government would be a much more difficult partner 
than the past regimes dependent on Western aid. Islamists will surely be intransigent 
about Palestine, because an uncompromising position in this issue will be fundamental 
for the legitimisation of their rule in the eyes of the Arab masses. Thus, what Islamism 
is after regarding the existing international order, is its revision.
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